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INTRODUCTION

"People in an open society do not demand infallibilityfrom their
institutions, but it is difficultfor them to accept what they areprohibited
from observing."
The California ballot initiative known as "Proposition 8" was placed
on the state's ballot in 2008. Its intention was to amend California's
Constitution so as to legally recognize only heterosexual marriages. 2
The controversy and debate surrounding Proposition 8, which began
well before the election, continued after the Proposition was approved
by California voters on November 4, 2008.3 The national attention the
ballot initiative received was only exacerbated on August 4, 2010, when
former Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District Court of
California overturned Proposition 8 as a violation of the U.S.
1. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980). This quote was
also referenced by Former Chief Judge Vaughn Walker in response to a motion by Proposition 8
proponents compelling Judge Walker to return a recording of the Proposition 8 trial in his
possession. See Letter from Vaughn Walker, Former Chief Judge, Northern District of
California, to Molly Dwyer, Clerk, U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal (Apr. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Letter from Chief Judge Vaughn Walker], available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.
gov/datastore/general/2011/04/14/10-16696_vaughnwalkerrespmotion.pdf
2. See Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 385 (Cal. 2009) ("Proposition 8, an initiative
measure approved by a majority of voters at the November 4, 2008 election, added a new
section-section 7.5-to article I of the California Constitution, providing: 'Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."').
3. See In California,Protests Over Gay Marriage Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at
Al8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/us/lOprotest.html?ref=californiaspropo
sition8samesexmarriage (finding that "[r]eaction[s] to the passage of a measure banning samesex marriage" were mixed across California); see also Mike Wakefield, Note, Compelled
Disclosure in the Wake of California'sProposition8: Exploring the Applicability of Buckley's
Minor PartyExemption to the Majority, 25 J.L. & POL. 375, 375 (2009) ("[No other] proposed
constitutional amendments attracted national media attention like the campaign surrounding
California's Proposition 8 .. . ."); Jesse McKinley, Across U.S., Big Rallies for Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l l/
16/us/16protest.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that just weeks after the 2008 approval of
Proposition 8, "one of the nation's largest displays of support for gay rights" had "tens of
thousands of people in cities across the country turn[ing] out in support of same-sex marriage").
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Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.4 Since then,
much legal ink has been spilled regarding the numerous legal and
societal issues raised by the Proposition 8 initiative. These topics
include issues of federalism, judicial recusal conflicts, 6
and of course
the substantive constitutional rights afforded to homosexual couples.
One issue in particular that had the potential to be just as significant and
influential went relatively unnoticed compared to the others at stake.
Many First Amendment scholars and media entities paid close attention
to how the Proposition 8 controversy would unfold, especially as to
whether the public would ever be able to get a glimpse of the now
infamous Proposition 8 trial recording. The Ninth Circuit answered that
question with a resounding "no"-or at least a "not yet." A closer look,
however, as to why the trial recording is still not public has raised some
valid concerns.
As this Note demonstrates, the Proposition 8 trial recording
controversy has forged a complex judicial path. The campaign to
constitutionally invalidate gay marriage in California had gained
national attention before and after the 2008 election, so it was no
surprise that many media outlets were interested in having the
Proposition 8 trial broadcasted live.8 After the District Court of
Northern California quickly amended its local rules to allow for the
broadcast,9 the Supreme Court of the United States stepped in and
issued a permanent stay because of the lower court's failure to
4. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992-1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
("Plaintiffs have demonstrated by overwhelming evidence that Proposition 8 violates their due
process and equal protection rights and that they will continue to suffer these constitutional
violations until state officials cease enforcement of Proposition 8."). While this decision would
later be appealed by Proposition 8 proponents to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), the Supreme Court would hold that the proponents did
not have proper standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Charles M Cannizzaro, Comment, Marriagein California:Is the Federal
Lawsuit Against Proposition 8 About Applying the Fourteenth Amendment or Preserving
Federalism?, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 161, 205-09 (2010) (arguing that federal courts redefining
marriage "would be interfering with the established principle that domestic relations, as an area
of traditional state concern, should be regulated on a local level so long as that regulation does
not violate a constitutional right").
6. See, e.g., Donald R. Lundberg, The Zone of Personal Privacy for Judges and
Lawyers, REs GESTAE, May 2011, at 27-29 (reviewing the arguments made by Proposition 8
Proponent's to vacate the district court's decision because of Judge Walker's failure to disclose
his homosexual relationship).
7. See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex
Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 913 (2011) (arguing that the Perry decision could have a
significant impact on the future constitutional challenges concerning gay rights in areas such as
discrimination and child rearing).
8. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 186 (2010) (per curiam) (stating that Judge
Walker's eagerness to broadcast the trial was in part due to the "prominence" of the case).
9. Id at 188.
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adequately amend its local rules in accordance with statutory
requirements.' 0 The story did not end there, however, as the district
judge ordered that the trial would be recorded for "use only in
chambers" and would also be added into the judicial record under seal."
Two years later, a request by news affiliates to release the Proposition 8
trial recording to the general public was granted.12 The Ninth Circuit,
falling back to the earlier promises made by the district court, reversed
the decision.' 3 In its rationale, the Ninth Circuit concluded "there [was]
a compelling reason in this case for overriding the common law right
[of access to court records.]"' 4 Citing to the district court's earlier
promises, the Ninth Circuit held it was reasonable for the Proposition 8
proponents to believe the district court as stating "there was no
possibility that the recording would be broadcast to the public in the
future."' While the Ninth Circuit had made clear its denial on releasing
the trial recording was "narrow" and based on the "unique
circumstances" of the case,' the court determined that the "grave threat
to the integrity of the system" was a compelling enough reason to
overcome the common law right of public access.' 7
This decision, however, is a curious one. Open access to judicial
proceedings has been an extensive part of this country's history.' The
idea of a constitutional right of access to criminal trials, for instance
has derived from the First Amendment's inherent constitutional rights.'1
Lower courts have extended this First Amendment right to civil judicial
records, 20 and many others have relied on the common law presumption
of access to the judiciary.21 The courts are unique because they are one
10. Id. at 197-99.
11. Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1081-84 (9th Cir. 2012).
12. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-02292IW, 2011 WL 4527349, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 19, 2011), rev'd,Perry,667 F.3d at 1078.
13. Perry,667 F.3d at 1088-89.
14. Id. at 1084.
15. Id. at 1081.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1087-89.
18. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-69 (1980)
(describing the history and tradition of criminal proceedings and finding "[i]n some instances,
the openness of trials was explicitly recognized as part of the fundamental law of the
Colon[ies]").
19. Id.; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603-04 (1982).
20. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to civil trials); Rushford v. N.Y.
Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We believe that the more rigorous First
Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary
judgment motion in a civil case.").
21. E.g., Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that
"absent some exceptional circumstances, trials are public proceedings"); see also Zenith Radio

2013]

FREEING THE PROP 8 TAPE: PERRY V. BROWN

183

of the few locations in which citizens hold a constitutional right of
access to many of its forums and records. 2 2 This right deserves a court's
fullest attention and consideration, especially when involving cases of
national importance such as the Proposition 8 trials. While "the integrity
of the judicial process," as the Ninth Circuit proclaimed, may be a value
that deserves attention when faced with the issue of releasing court
records, what is of equal, if not greater importance is the execution of

judicial policies and procedures that "permit[] the public to participate

in and serve as a check upon the judicial process." 23 This poses the
question: Should the promises of a trial judge concerning the disclosure
of a nationally influential, nonjury civil trial video recording be enough
to overcome the presumptive openness of the judiciary? If so, what
response, if any, should be made in order to balance our societal need of
information with the possible damage that might come from an
overpromising judiciary?
This Note argues that the common law presumed right of access, in
conjunction with First Amendment values, should have tipped the scales
to compel the release of the Proposition 8 trial recordings. This
presumed right, equally weighed against the narrow circumstances of
Judge Walker's remarks and an overall concern for "judicial integrity"
should have outweighed any minimal consequences that might have
occurred upon the Proposition 8 trial recording's release.
Part I delves deeper into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Proposition 8 trial recording controversy, from the actual recording of
the Proposition 8 trial in 2010 to the Ninth Circuit's decision to prevent
the public release of the recording in 2012. Part II examines the
competing values at issue in the Ninth Circuit's decision to deny the
release of the Proposition 8 trial recording: the right of access to judicial
records and the integrity of the judiciary. It looks at the common law
and First Amendment influence of the ever-expanding approach to
constitutional disclosure of judicial proceedings, followed by an
examination of how courts have analyzed the importance of judicial
integrity in other judicial contexts. Part III argues that, based upon the
statements made by Judge Walker, the Ninth Circuit mischaracterized
the promises made to the parties after the Supreme Court stayed the live
broadcasting of the Proposition 8 federal district trial. The Part will also
analyze the broad competing values of judicial integrity and the

Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 895-96 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("It
beyond dispute that in this country judicial proceedings and records are presumptively open
the public.").
22. Cf Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (finding no constitutional right
access to government-run prison facilities).
23. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 (explaining the particular features that serve
justify a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials).

is
to
of
to
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presumption of access to judicial proceedings, arguing that the
presumption of access should prevail. Finally, this Part discusses the
impact that the Ninth Circuit's decision may have on the right of access
to judicial proceedings.
I. HOLLINGSWORTH V.PERRY, PERRY V.SCHWARZENEGGER, AND PERRY
V. BROWN: THE PROPOSITION 8 TRIAL RECORDING'S WINDING ROAD

The resolution by the Ninth Circuit to deny public disclosure of the
Proposition 8 trial recording is only one segment of these somewhat
complex proceedings. As this Note demonstrates, the courts' struggle
with whether to allow the broadcast of the Proposition 8 trial and the
compromises that would follow are what ultimately shaped the
definitive decision to deny public release of the recording in Perry v.
Brown. To place the Ninth Circuit's decision in context, it is best to
understand some of the background concerning the Proposition 8 trials.
A. Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Issue ofBroadcasting the Trial
The plaintiffs, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, had applied for a
marriage license at the Alameda County Clerk's office in Oakland,
California, but were denied their license because of Proposition 8's
constitutional amendment.2 4 Shortly thereafter, Perry and Stier filed suit
against the State of California for infringing on their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection. After the suit was filed,
multiple organizations, entities, and individuals that rallied support to
place Proposition 8 on the ballot (the "proponents") intervened as the
"official proponents" of the ballot initiative. 6
Before the Proposition 8 federal trial,2 7 the Ninth Circuit was
contemplating a rule that would allow district court judges the
discretion, under limited circumstances, to broadcast civil trials to the
public.2 8 At the time, and still to this day, it is generally federal district

24. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Paul Katami
and Jeffrey Zarrillo were also named plaintiffs and were denied a marriage license in Los
Angeles due to the Proposition 8 amendment. Id.
25. Id. at 927.
26. Id. at 954. Specifically, the named official proponents were Dennis Hollingsworth,
Gail Knight, Martin Gutierrez, Hak-Shing William Tam, and Mark Jansson. Id.
27. There was a state case concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 8; however, this
case is not the focus of this Note. See generally Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009)
(affirming Proposition 8 under state constitutional grounds).
28. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 186-88 (2010) (per curiam).
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court practice to deny the recording and broadcasting of civil trials. 29
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the principal
policymaking body of U.S. courts, 30 had generally disapproved any
recommendations to alter its policy prohibiting the broadcasting or
recording of civil proceedings. 3 1 At its September 2010 conference,
however, the Judicial Conference approved a limited pilot program that
would grant courts the discretion to record proceedings in order to
"evaluate the effect[s] of cameras in federal district courtrooms and the
public release of digital video recordings of some civil proceedings." 32
The Ninth Circuit, following suit, "appointed a three-judge committee
to evaluate the possibility of adopting a Ninth Circuit Rule regarding the
recording and transmission of district court proceedings." 3 After the
committee's recommendation, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council "voted
unanimously to allow the 15 district courts within the Ninth Circuit to
experiment with the dissemination of video recordings in civil non-jury
matters." 34 The program approved by the Ninth Circuit would give the
discretion to the chief judge in each district court to determine which
cases would be considered for the program. 35
It was only a few days after the blessing by the Ninth Circuit that a
media coalition contacted Chief District Judge Vaughn Walker, who
was also assigned the Proposition 8 trial, to request that the trial be
available for live broadcast.3 6 Media powerhouses ABC, CNN, and Fox
29. See History of Cameras in the Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.
gov/Multimedia/Cameras/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (explaining that, while
fourteen courts are currently participating in a pilot program to evaluate the effects of cameras
during trial, the majority of courts still prohibit the use of cameras at civil trials).
30. Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/JudicialConference.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
31. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 35, 47 (denying a policy recommendation by

the Court Administration and Case Management Committee to expand the authorization of
broadcasting and recording civil proceedings, stating that "the intimidating effect of cameras on
some witnesses and jurors was cause for concern").
32. David Sellers, JudiciaryApproves Pilot Projectfor Cameras in District Courts, U.S.
Courts, Sept. 14, 2010, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-09-14/Judici
aryApproves Pilot Project for CamerasinDistrict Courts.aspx; see also History of
Cameras in the FederalCourts, supra note 29.
33. Hollingsworth,558 U.S. at 186.
34. Press Release, Pub. Info. Office of the U.S. Courts for the Ninth Cir., Ninth Circuit
Approves Experimental Use of Cameras in District Courts (Dec. 21, 2009), available at http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/137-Decl 7_CamerasPress-Release.pdf.
35. Id.
36. See Letter from Thomas R. Burke, Attorney for the Media Coal., to C.J. Vaughn
Walker, N.D. Cal. (Dec. 21, 2009). The Media Coalition also filed a formal memorandum to the
Court in support of the broadcast. See Non-Party Media Coalition's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Request for Order Permitting Televised Coverage of the Trial, Perry v.

Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, Case No. 09-2292, at *2 (Dec. 31, 2009).
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News, among others, expressed their willingess "to provide gavel to
gavel 'pooled' coverage" of the proceedings. In order to accommodate
a trial broadcast, Judge Walker announced his intentions to amend the
district's local rules, and five days later, amended Civil Local Rule 77-3
to allow the recording and broadcasting of civil trials in the Northern
District "for participation in a pilot or other project authorized by the
Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit." 38 Judge Walker announced that
the sudden amendment to the Local Rule was authorized under the
"immediate need" exception to the district court's rulemaking power. 39
Absent the exception, the statute requires a district court to conduct
public notice and comment before amending its local rules.4 0
The proponents of Proposition 8 were understandably opposed to
any open broadcasting of the trial.4 1 Countless stories of harassment to
supporters of Proposition 8 had been reported,4 2 and many expert
witnesses had made it clear that "they [would] not testify if the trial
[was] broadcast[ed]."A The proponents issued formal letters through
their lead counsel, Charles Cooper, arguing that the amendment to the
Civil Local Rules violated the proponents' due process rights for failing
to adhere to the notice and comment requirements. Additionally, the
proponents argued that given the immense national attention of the case,
any live broadcast or recording could chill the willingness of expert
witnesses to participate and could potentially place the proponents in a
negative light.4 5

37. See Letter from Thomas R. Burke, supra note 36.
38. Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 187 (quoting Civ. C.R. 77-3 (amended in 2011)).
Originally, Civil Local Rule 77-3 had "banned the recording or broadcast of court proceedings."
Id.
39. Id.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012) ("If the prescribing court determines that there is an
immediate need for a rule, such court may proceed [in proscribing its rules] without public
notice and opportunity for comment, but such court shall promptly thereafter afford such notice
and opportunity for comment.").
41. See Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 186; see also Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Attorney
for Proponents, to C.J. Vaughn Walker, N.D. Cal. (Dec. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from
Charles J. Cooper], available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/californial
candce/3:2009cv02292/215270/324/.
42. See Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 195 (citing to proponents submission of "71 news
articles detailing incidents of harassment related to people who supported Proposition 8").
43. Id.
44. Letter from Charles J. Cooper, supra note 41, at 2-6.
45. Id. at 7 ("[P]otential witnesses have already expressed to [p]roponents' counsel their
great distress at the prospect of having their testimony televised. Indeed, some potential
witnesses have indicated that they will not be willing to testify at all if the trial is broadcast or
webcast.").
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The district court ordered the broadcasting, despite the proponent's
objection.4 6 Once their formal requests were denied, the proponents
attempted to prevent the broadcast "by requesting a stay from the
District Court for the Northern District of California and a writ of
mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."4 7 Finally,
the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the proponents'
petition, and the Court ultimately agreed that the broadcast should be
stayed because of the district court's failure to adhere to its rulemaking
policies. 48 The Supreme Court was clear that its review would be
"confined to a narrow legal issue: whether the District Court's
amendment of its local rules to broadcast [the] trial complied with
federal law." 49 The Court granted the stay, however, stating that "[t]here
is substantial merit to the argument that [five days] was not
'appropriate' notice and an opportunity for comment."50
B. Perry v. Schwarzenegger: The Recording of the Trial and the
Release of the Recording Two Years Later
With the Supreme Court's decision in place, Judge Walker was
prohibited from broadcasting the Proposition 8 trial. 5 ' By this point, the
Proposition 8 trial was under way and the first few days had already
been recorded pending the Supreme Court's decision. Despite the
ruling, Judge Walker informed the parties the "digital recording" of the
trial would continue for "use in chambers." 53 The recording in its
entirety was entered into the judicial record on August 4, 2010, and was
used by the parties and Judge Walker "in preparing the findings of fact
and conclusions of law." 54 The proponents would eventually yield to
Judge Walker's decision to record the trial only after the judge assured
the parties that the recording would only be used in chambers and
would not, under the order of the Supreme Court, be used for

46. Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 188.
47. On Application for Immediate Stay of the Dist. Court's Order Permitting Pub. Broad.
of Trial Proceedings, at Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. 183 (No. 09-A648), 2010 WL 181579, at *1.
48. See Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 198-99.
49. Id. at 189.
50. Id. at 192.
51. Id. at 199.
52. Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012). The trial began on January 11,
2010, with the first two days recorded "on the basis that the Supreme Court might decide to lift
the temporary stay." Id. The Supreme Court, however, would grant the stay on January 13,
2010. Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 183.
53. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-02292JW, 2011 WL 4527349, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 19, 2011).
54. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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broadcasting or televising.s5 In addition to adding the recording to the
record, Judge Walker entered his final order of the Proposition 8 trial in
favor of Perry and Stier. 56 Judge Walker also retained a copy of the
recordings for himself as part of his judicial papers upon retirement,5 7
and had used portions of the recording in his endeavors as a professor
and public speaker.
One year after the final ruling on the Proposition 8 case, and two
years after the stay of the live broadcast, the Proposition 8 case had
made its way to the Ninth Circuit for appeal. 9 Meanwhile, the
proponents became aware of (now former) Judge Walker's public use of
the recording and petitioned the district court's new Chief Judge, Judge
James Ware, to "order . . . [J]udge Vaughn Walker cease further
disclosures of the video recordings . . . and that all copies of the trial

recordings in the possession, custody, or control of any party to this
case ... be returned." 60 Perry, along with a non-party coalition of media
companies, not only objected to the proponents' request, but also moved
to completely unseal the Proposition 8 trial recording. 6 1 The new media
coalition, consisting of some of the entities who had initially requested
the broadcasting of the trial, along with some prominent print media
organizations,62 argued the First Amendment and the common law
presumption of access should allow for the recording to be unsealed and
available to the public. 6 3
On September 19, 2011, the district court lifted the protective order,
entered the trial recording into the public record and ordered Judge
Walker was entitled to maintain his copy of the trial recording. 64 Judge
Ware first recognized the common law presumption of access applied to
the trial recording. The court determined "transparency 'is pivotal to
55. Perry,667 F.3d at 1082.
56. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04.
57. Schwarzenegger,2011 WL 4527349, at *2.
58. See John Schwartz, Proposition8 Hearing Video Is OrderedReleased by Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A20, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/judge-orders-release-ofvideo-of-proposition-8-hearing.html.
59. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Circ. 2012), rev'd, Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
60. Appellants' Motion for Order Compelling Return of Trial Recording, Perry v. Brown,
667 F.3d 1078, No. 09-CV-2292JW, at *1 (Apr. 13, 2011).
61. Schwarzenegger,2011 WL 4527349, at *2.
62. The Coalition consisted of the L.A. Times, CNN, the New York Times, FOX News,
NBC News, and the Associated Press, among others. See Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 4527349,
at *2 n.7.
63. Plaintiff-Appellees' Opposition to Appellants' Motion Regarding Trial Recordings
and Plaintiff-Appellees' Motion to Unseal, Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, No. CV-0902292JW, at *1-3 (Apr. 15, 2011).
64. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 4527349, at *6.
65. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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public perception of the judiciary's legitimacy and independence,"' 66
and found courts should only prevent such transparency when "the
damage that would be caused by making public certain aspects of
judicial proceedings is so significant that it must override the public's
interest in being able to freely scrutinize those proceedings." 67 The court
recognized two principle arguments presented by the proponents that
failed to overcome the presumption of access: first, the conditions under
which the digital recording was created; and second, the chilling effect
on expert witnesses and other public policy considerations.68
The proponents' primary argument was that the recording should not
be made public "because it was originally created on condition that it
not be publicly disseminated outside the courthouse." 69 The court found,
first, the order by Judge Walker did not confine the records to the court
only. 70 The court reasoned because both parties had obtained copies of
the recording during the course of the trial, and because segments of the
recording were used during closing arguments, any argument that the
recording was limited to the court was not a compelling reason to
overcome the recording's release. 7 Additionally, the court stated that
"no authority" was offered "in support of the proposition that the
conditions under which one 4udge places a document under seal are
binding on a different judge."
Finally, the court found the "chilling effect" that might occur
because of the "detrimental consequences" that broadcasting federal
proceedings might have could not overcome the particular recording of
the Proposition 8 trial.7 3 Finding the proponents' argument as "mere
'unsupported hypothesis or conjecture,"' the court found the strong
presumption in favor of access outweighed the proponents' fear that
public dissemination of the recording could have a chilling effect on
expert witness' willingness to cooperate in future proceedings.7 4 The
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *4. The Court also addressed two other issues presented by the proponents:
(1) the injunction issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, and (2) the effect of Civil Local Rule 77-3.
Id. The court did not find the Supreme Court's stay as a compelling argument, as the Court's
decision to stay the broadcast was confined to "whether the District Court's amendment of its
local rules to broadcast the trial complied with federal law." Id. (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183, 189 (2010)). As to the Civil Local Rule, the court found that Rule 77-3 only
effected the "creation" of digital records, and "at the time the digital recording at issue was
made, there was no objection that Local Rule 77-3 prohibited its creation." Id at *5.
69. Id. at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *5-6.
74. Id. at *5.
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district court ordered the recording be unsealed.7 5
C. Perry v. Brown: Integrity of the JudicialProcessas a Compelling
Reason to Deny Access
Following the district court's order to unseal the record, the
proponents appealed to the Ninth Circuit.76 In Perry v. Brown, the court
was faced with "whether there [was] a sufficiently compelling reason to
override [the presumption of public access]." 7 7 The court determined
the district court had abused its discretion by releasing the recording,
finding that the "[p]roponents reasonably relied on Chief Judge
Walker's specific assurances . . . that the recording would not be

broadcast to the public."7 8 According to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Ware
had "contravene[d] the very notion of judicial integrity" by holding that
''no . . . assurances had been given" that the recording would remain

sealed.7
The Ninth Circuit first found that there were "unequivocal
assurances that the video recording at issue would not be accessible to
the public."80 The court pointed to two statements made by Judge
Walker after the Supreme Court's permanent stay to make such a
conclusion. 8 First, Judge Walker stated he was "going to continue
'taking the recording for purposes of use in chambers,' but that the
recording was 'not going to be for purposes of public broadcasting or
televising."' 82 The court stated it would be "unreasonable" after hearing
Judge Walker's comments and reading the Supreme Court decision "to
foresee that a recording made for such limited purposes might
nonetheless be released for viewing by the public, either during or after
Second, Judge Walker stated, as a criticism of the
the trial."
proponents' reluctance to provide more witnesses during trial, that "the
potential for public broadcast . . . had been eliminated." 8 4 Again, the
court pointed to these comments as "unequivocal statement js l" that "the
recording would not be made available for public viewing." The Ninth
75. Id. at *6.
76. See Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2012).
77. Id. at 1084. The court assumed "for purposes of this case only," that the common law
presumption of public access did apply to the Proposition 8 trial recording. Id.
78. Id. at 1084.
79. Id. at 1084-85.
80. Id. at 1085.
81. See id. (finding that, "[i]nterpreted in their full context, at least two of Chief Judge
Walker's statements" assured that there would be no public release of the recording).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.

FREEING THE PROP8 TAPE: PERRY V. BROWN

2013]

191

Circuit concluded the "record clearly show[ed] that Chief Judge Walker
did make a commitment not to permit the public broadcast of the
recording." 86
At the heart of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning was the district court's
failure "to appreciate the importance of preserving the integrity of the
judicial system."87 To revoke Judge Walker's promises, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned, "would cause serious damage to the integrity of the
judicial process-damage that under any plausible, logical application
of the 'compelling reason' standard would have caused [the district
court] to keep the recording sealed."88 The court emphasized the
importance of judicial integrity by stating, "[1]itigants and the public
must be able to trust the word of a judge if our justice system is to
function properly."89
The court also assumed that a First Amendment right to judicial
records in civil proceedings existed. 90 For the sake of argument, the
court proffered that even if the First Amendment applied, "the integrity
of the judicial process is a compelling interest that in these
circumstances would be harmed by the nullification of the trial judge's
express assurances, and that there are no alternatives to maintaining the
recording under seal that would protect the compelling interest at
issue." 91 Under the common law presumption, and an assumed First
Amendment right, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the integrity of the
judicial system was enough to prevent the disclosure of the Proposition
8 trial recording. 92
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, THE RIGHT OF ACCESS, AND THE
VALUE OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
At the heart of the Ninth Circuit's argument is the balancing of two
perceived counter-values: the right of access to judicial records and the
integrity of the judicial process. However, the court gives little
emphasis as to how these two values contribute to the judicial branch as
a whole, and more specifically why the narrow circumstances of this
case weigh in favor of preserving the integrity of the judicial process
over the public's right to view the Proposition 8 trial recording. To
better understand the interplay between these two values in relation to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1086.
1087.
1087-88.
1088.
1088-89.
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the Proposition 8 trial, a closer look at each is warranted.
A. The Right and Presumptionto JudicialAccess
1. The Historical Background of an Open Judiciary
Dating back to the age of the Roman Empire, the idea of an open
judiciary has been a "longstanding" practice. While seen more today
as an "obligation of the state," the openness of early judicial actions and
procedures "[were] to impress on viewers the power of the state." 94
Philosophers, however, would later have a different understanding of
the role of public disclosure, based in part on the idea that "[b]ecause
knowledge was so frail and truth unknowable ... it would be best to put
all ideas before the public." 95 This argument, accredited to philosopher
John Locke, exhibited a broad libertarian belief that the role of
government was to protect the fundamental liberties of its citizens. 96
The development of this libertarian ideal, and others like it, would
eventually evolve into one of the main focal points of the "colonists'
revolutionary rhetoric." 97
This country's founders understood the necessity of government
access as a requirement for an informed society. 98 As James Madison
stated, "A popular government without popular information or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy." 99 Early
colonial customs would soon follow and develop traditions that
supported an open judiciary.1oo For instance, early versions of many
state constitutions, including Delaware, Kentucky, and Vermont, would
proclaim that "all courts shall be open." 10 In Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court observed that, based upon its
research, there was "nothing to suggest that the presumptive openness
of the trial, which English courts were later to call 'one of the essential
93. Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: "Open Courts," "Terror Trials," and Public
Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HuM. RTs. 2, 6-9 (2010).
94. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
95. Sigman L. Splichal, The Right to Know, in ACCEsS DENIED: FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION INTHE INFORMATION AGE 5 (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L. Splichal eds., 2000)

[hereinafter ACCESS DENIED] (discussing the arguments set forth by philosopher John Locke).
96. Id. at 4-5.
97. Id. at 5-6.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), pertinent
portion reprintedin THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul Padover, ed., 1953)).

100. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 93, at 8 (describing the 1676 Fundamental Laws of West
New Jersey, an early charter of the colony which held that "in all publick [sic] courts of justice
for tryals [sic] of cause . . . any person . . . may freely come into, and attend the said

courts. . .. ").
101. Id. at 9-10.
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qualities of a court of justice,' was not also an attribute of the judicial
systems of colonial America."' 02
Under modem legal doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized a
"constitutional right of the press to publish information it gathers about
public issues" but has scarcely extended such a constitutional right to
the "compelled disclosure" of government-held information.103 Legal
theories of the twentieth century, falling back to the words and
influences of the Founding Fathers, "support[ed] the role of a free and
vigorous press in American society and its need for public
information."' 04 However, this need for information would not evolve
into a general "right of access." The U.S. Supreme Court has "never
recognized a constitutional right of access to government information,
or a right to gather information."' 0 5
In Houchins v. KQED, the Court stated that while prior decisions
"emphasized the importance of informed public opinion and the
traditional role of a free press as a source of public information," these
cases did not require that "the Constitution compel[] the government to
provide the media with information or access to it on demand." 06 What
seems to be a small exception to this lack of constitutional protection
would be the right of access to the court system.107 While "the law of
access to court proceedings and records is still a work in progress,"' 0 8
judicial proceedings have continued to grow into one of the few fora, if
not the only forum, in which compelling government disclosure is
constitutionally protected under certain circumstances.' 09
2. Access to Judicial Proceedings: A Common Law Presumption and a
First Amendment Value
The development of a constitutional right of access to judicial
proceedings has only been addressed by the Supreme Court in matters
102. 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (quoting Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B.
1829)).
103. Splichal, supra note 95, at 11, 13.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 12.
106. 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
107. Matthew D. Bunker, Closing the Courtroom: Judicial Access and Constitutional
Scrutiny After Richmond Newspaper, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 95, at 155-57.
108. Id. at 156.
109. See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Toward a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 249, 251-52 (2004) (explaining that the Supreme Court has held that there is no First
Amendment right of access to information controlled by the government "unless the information
concerns the conduct of criminal trials (in which case the strictest form of First Amendment
scrutiny does apply to any governmental interference)").
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concerning criminal trials.110 The Court faced the question of whether
the right to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the U.S.
Constitution in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.I' John Paul
Stevenson was indicted for murdering a hotel manager, and three of his
previous proceedings for the murder had ended in mistrials.12 In
Stevenson's fourth trial attempt, the judge decided to prevent any other
miscues and ordered that the courtroom "be kept clear of all parties
except the witnesses when they testify."'' 3 Two reporters with
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. were present when the order was handed
down and were removed from the courtroom."14
No majority opinion was issued in Richmond Newspapers,Inc., but a
majority of the Justices agreed the press had a constitutional right to
attend the trial.115 Chief Justice Warren Burger found that "[t]he Bill of
Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials
being presumptively open,"ll 6 and that "the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give
meaning [to the explicit guarantees of freedom of speech and press]."ll 7
Justice William Brennan, also finding that the First Amendment
protected the right of access to the trial, opined, "[o]pen trials assure the
public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded
equally.""
The Supreme Court would reaffirm the Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
majority in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court."9 At the time,
Massachusetts law required trial judges to exclude the public from the
courtroom during the testimony of young victims of sexually related
crimes. 120 During one such sexual assault criminal trial, members of the
Globe Newspaper Co. were denied access. 121 The Court began by
110. Bunker, supra note 107, at 156-62 (2000).
111. 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, did consider whether the
public was afforded the right to attend a public criminal trial in the earlier case of Gannet Co. v.
Depasquale, but limited its rationale to the Sixth Amendment. See 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979);
see also Matthew E. Feinberg, The Prop8 DecisionAnd CourtroomDrama in the Youtube Age:
Why Camera Use Should Be Permitted in Courtrooms During High Profile Civil Cases, 17
CARDozo J.L. & GENDER. 33, 40-41 (2010).
112. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559.
113. Id.at 560.
114. Id.
115. See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Although no opinion
commanded a majority [in Richmond Newspapers], seven justices agreed that the public has
such a right.").
116. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
117. Id. at 556.
118. Id at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. 457 U.S. 596, 598, 602 (1982).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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reaffirming Richmond Newspapers, Inc., stating that the case "firmly
established for the first time that the press and general public have a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials." 2 In finding that the
First Amendment protected the right of open access, the Court required
only a compelling government interest, narrowly tailored so as to not
infringe upon more constitutional rights than is necessary to protect that
interest, would survive constitutional scrutiny.123 While the Court found
that "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor" was a compelling interest, requiring the mandatory closure of
trial courts could not ensure that the "constitutional right of the press
and public to gain access to criminal trials [would] not be restricted
except where necessary." 24 The scope of a right of access to criminal
trials has been litigated on occasion after Globe Newspaper Co. and
Richmond Newspaper, Inc.,125 but a consistent understanding could be
concluded from the Court's holdings: the openness of the judiciary is a
principle foundation to the constitutional rights inherent within the First
Amendment.
While some circuit courts have interpreted the holding in cases like
Globe Newspaper Co. and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. to extend the
First Amendment's right of access to civil proceedings as well,1 2 6 other
courts have simply relied on the common law presumption of public
access when faced with a question of whether to disclose civil judicial
records.127 The common law rule has been expressed as such, "[E]very
person is entitled to the inspection . . . of public records, including

legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he has an interest
therein which is such as would enable him to maintain or defend an
action for which the document or record sought can furnish evidence or
necessary information." 28 The modern understanding of the common
122. Id. at 603.
123. Id. at 606-07.
124. Id. 609.
125. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 821-22, 823 n.8
(1984) (First Amendment right of access extends to voir dire proceedings).
126. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-71 (3d Cir. 1984)
(finding that the "[pjublic access to civil trials, no less than criminal trials, plays an important
role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs"). Additionally, other
circuits have found that a First Amendment right exists, but "it does not exceed. . . the
traditional common law right." In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325,
1339 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
127. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (E.D.
Penn. 2004) (applying the common law presumption of access to the unsealing of documents
related to an arbitration proceeding); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)
(applying the common law presumption of access to pleading documents in the court record
related to a civil proceeding).
128. Fayette Cnty. v. Martin, 130 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939), overruled on
other grounds by City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct.
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law right includes "a general right to inspect and copy public records
and documents, including judicial records and documents."l29 The
burden typically falls on the party seeking to prevent disclosure to
provide a "compelling reason" why the right should be overcome.130
The Supreme Court recognized the common law presumption of
access to records in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. During
the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, several Nixon advisers were
charged with conspiring to obstruct justice.' 32 After their indictment, the
prosecution filed a subpoena with former President Richard Nixon,
requesting the audio recordings of several meetings and telephone
conversations the President had while in office.1 33 Warner
Communications, Inc. requested the tapes, now entered into evidence,
so they could "copy, broadcast, and sell to the public the portions of the
tapes played at trial." 3 4 The Court recognized a common law right to
copy and inspect public records, but noted that the right "is not
absolute." 35 The Court did not decide the case on the merits of the
common law presumption,136 but stated the application of the common
law presumption "is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case."l 37
Since Nixon, the circuits have varied as to their application of the
common law presumption to access judicial records. 1 In United States
v. Graham,for instance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with Darryl Graham's request to prevent the broadcast media from
copying and inspecting the audio and video tapes played during his
App. 1974).
129. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
130. Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
131. 435 U.S. at 597.
132. Id. at 592.
133. Id. at 592-93.
134. Id. at 594.
135. Id. at 598. Specifically, the court recognized the common law presumption could be
overcome if the information sought were to be used for "private spite," to "promote public
scandal," or "as sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive
standing." Id.
136. Id. at 603 ("We need not decide how the balance [of interests advanced by the
parties] would be struck.. . . There is in this case an additional, unique element that was neither
advanced by the parties nor given appropriate consideration by the courts below.").
137. Id. at 599.
138. See, e.g., M.P. v. Schwartz, 853 F. Supp. 164, 168-69 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that
the "concern in preserving the confidentiality of . .. minor[s]" required the redaction of named
juvenile defendants, but still allowed access to a forty-nine page complaint filed within a
juvenile hearing). Due to the complexity and volume of state and federal cases discussing the
common law presumption of access to civil proceedings, any generalizations of the presumption
are beyond the scope of this Note.
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detention hearing, arguing that Graham's right to a fair trial would be
prejudiced. 139 Graham was arrested for and charged with conspiracy to
possess and distribute cocaine.14 0 After his arrest, the court ordered a
partially open detention hearing, 14 1 in which audio and video recordings
were presented by the government and entered into the record.142 The
court determined Graham's "right to a fair trial" was not sufficiently
adversely affected to overcome the presumption of access.14 3 While the
court stated the "right ... to a fair trial is of the utmost importance," the
court disagreed that "the likelihood of such enhanced awareness of the
tapes poses the kind of risk to fair trials for [the] defendants that
justifies curtailing the public's right of access to courtroom
evidence." 44 As shown by cases like Nixon and Graham, the common
law presumption of access has been a useful tool in protecting the
transparency and openness of the country's judicial system. 145
B. The Integrity of the JudicialProcess
1. A Brief History and Understanding of Judicial Integrity
While the term is a bit subjective, the "integrity" of the judiciary has
been a consistent presence in the English common law and American
jurisprudence, if not for all democratic societies. 146 During the colonial
era, judges served at the pleasure of the English Crown. This was quite
frustrating to colonial lawmakers whose attempts to enact laws that
would reauthorize the judiciary to the colonies were being consistently
rejected by the monarch. 147 What resulted in the colonists' eyes was a
139. United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
140. Id.
141. Due to the fact that some of the evidence would "create a substantial probability of
prejudice to the defendants" if released, portions of the detention hearing were closed to the
public. Id. at 146.
142. Id. at 147. The tapes played by the government were "excerpts from a number of
audio and video tapes featuring conversations between and among [Graham, his coconspirators,] and a confidential informant." Id.
143. Id. at 154-56.
144. Id. at 154-55 (quoting United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980)).
145. With that being said, "[t]he types of materials which comprise the judicial record and
to which the common law right to inspect and copy therefore attaches have not been thoroughly
catalogued." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 897 (E.D.
Penn. 1981).
146. The role of the judiciary is, no doubt, a very broad, complex, and multifaceted topic.
To the extent possible, this paper limits the discussion of the judiciary as it was used by the
court in Perry. More specifically, this paper is limited to the view of the judiciary as upholding
the integrity of the legal system.
147. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 24 (2008). This frustration was an added
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"lesson that . . . the integrity of the judicial branch and the separate

power it exercises can and will be undermined unless the judiciary is
afforded a measure of institutional independence." 48 Thus, leading up
to the Constitutional Convention, it was clear that in order to adequately
enforce the laws of a new country, judges would need to be
"independent individually as decision makers and collectively as a
separate branch of government." 49
With the country's newly established independent judicial branch,
coupled with the development of judicial review and the evolution of
the English common law, the judiciary quickly became a very powerful
and authoritative branch of government.15 0 Many judges began to
recognize the immense power they now controlled and determined that
self-abnegation within the position was an absolute necessity.' Some
of the most influential judges in American history, including Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, and Justice Felix
Frankfurter, all recognized that judges must maintain a consistent
adherence to the "taught tradition of the law."' 5 2 Judge Cardozo stated
that "a jurist 'is not to innovate at pleasure . . . . He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. . . . He is to exercise a

discretion informed b
disciplined by system."
judicial practice include:

tradition, methodized by analogy, [and]
The principles that form the foundation of

[The] abiding sense of judicial integrity that comes with the robe;
a consciousness of precedent; rule of procedure; recognition of
the Court's threefold role as a governmental, political, and legal
institution; . . . an awareness of membership in the body politic,

of the responsibility of not being too far out of step with
consciences .. .; [and] the concept of equality before the law and

grievance to the Declaration of Independence, indicting King George III as "obstruct[ing] the
Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers."
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776).

148.
149.

GEYH, supra note 147, at 24.
Id. at 27.

150.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES OF THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, THE

JUDGE'S BOOK 5 (10th ed. 1996) [hereinafter THE JUDGE'S BOOK].
151.

See

HENRY

J.

ABRAHAM,

THE

JUDICIARY,

THE

SUPREME

COURT

IN

THE

GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 79-82 (1996).

152.

Id. at 82.

153.

Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141

(1921)).
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at the bar of the Supreme Court.1 54
Today, the judicial branch continues to take its perception of
integrity and honesty as a founding principle of the profession. The
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, for instance, adopted as its first canon
the following: "An independent and honorable judiciary is
indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should maintain and
enforce high standards of conduct and should personally observe those
standards, so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved."15 5 The American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of
Judicial Conduct has also adopted as its first canon that "a Judge shall
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
Judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety."l 5 6 Under the ABA canon, a judge is required to act at all
times in a manner that reflects the independent integrity of the court so
as to not "undermine[] public confidence in the judiciary." 5 7 The
Judicial Administration Division of the ABA, in offering guidance to
newly-minted judges, has advocated that "[r]espect for the Rule of Law
and respect for the judicia57 are the greatest guarantors of order and
constitutional democracy."'
2. The Value of Judicial Integrity and Its Application in Judicial
Decision Making
The "abiding sense of judicial integrity" articulated by Justice
Cardozo and developed over generations of judicial progress does not
stop at simply providing background for judicial history. As the Ninth
Circuit demonstrated in Perry, the idea of "judicial integrity" can shape
the way in which judicial discretion is effectuated. The idea that a court
must maintain and preserve the integrity of the judiciary has played a
significant part in shaping judicial doctrine. Two of the most
fundamental examples of judicial integrity influencing doctrine, which
will help place the Ninth Circuit's decision into context, are found
within the application of stare decisis and the exclusionary rule.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere ("stare decisis"), or "to stand by
the things decided," is a doctrine in which a court is required to follow
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in later
154.

Id.

155.

See 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY 2-3 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/

Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf.
156. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2001). Every state has since adopted
its own form of Judicial Canons. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 150, at 303.
157. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2011).
158. THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 150, at 301.
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litigation.15 9 The rule developed as a "rule of etiquette or conventional
decorum" in which judges would defer to the opinion of other judges as
a means of "certainty, stability and propriety in the law."' 60 Under the
doctrine, prior court decisions that have the potential for affecting future
cases are taken as precedential.161
The defining rationales of "certainty and predictability" that support
the doctrine of stare decisis stem from the court's adherence to judicial
integrity.162 By upholding the doctrine of stare decisis, the theor3 goes,
judges maintain certainty in the law and to society in general.
This
rationale has been around for quite some time, as one early nineteenthcentury English Lord opined that "certainty is often equated with
finality of litigation, itself a desirable feature of the system."' 64 The
Supreme Court itself has also expounded on the doctrine's intent, as
noted by the Ninth Circuit in Perry, holding the doctrine as
"promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development
of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and
contribut ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.
As stated by Raimo Siltala as part of the "criteria of justice"
ideology that justifies the use of stare decisis, "[fjormal predictability
corresponds to the uniformity of judicial adjudication, giving priority to
the 'transparency' and foreseeability of future litigation at the cost of
the content-bound considerations in subsequent cases."l 66 In other
words, trust in a predictable system benefits society by giving potential
litigants the foresight of success or potential failure. Whether it was the
doctrine that brought about the judicial systems' reliance on certainty
and predictability, or vice versa, the importance of integrity has become
a defining characteristic of one of the law's most cherished doctrines.
Outside of the uniform applicability of stare decisis, the concept of
judicial integrity is often cited as one of the founding rationales for the
application of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a
discretionary remedy in which judges exclude evidence from trial when
159.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009).

160.

J. DAVID MURPHY & ROBERT RUETER, STARE DECISIS IN COMMONWEALTH APPELLATE

COURTS 2 (1981) (quoting Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Canada v. Canadian Car & Foundry
Co. (1918), 44 D.L.R. 378, per Audette J. at 379).
161.

RAIMO SILTALA, A THEORY OF PRECEDENT: FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A PosT-

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 66 (2000).

162.

MURPHY & RUETER, supra note 160, at 93.

163. Id. at 93-96.
164. Id. at 94 (citing to the words of Lord Halsbury in London Street Tramsway).
165. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); see also Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d
1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2012).
166. SILTALA, supra note 161, at 74 (describing the "criteria of justice" ideology of
precedent-following).
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the evidence was procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 6 7 The use of the
exclusionary rule is not a constitutional necessity,' 68 but has been found
to be an adequate judicial tool in certain situations, such as instances of
objectively unreasonable law enforcement behavior.169 While the use of
the exclusionary rule has been hotly debated, the origins and inception
of the rule derived in part from the Supreme Court's attempt to preserve
judicial integrity. 7 0
The Supreme Court's original approach to the exclusionary rule, as
held in Weeks v. United States, was that the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence was a requirement of the Constitution.171 In making
its ruling, the Court articulated one of the fundamental rationales for the
exclusion of evidence via the exclusionary rule: "the interest in judicial
integrity requires that the courts not sanction illegal searches by
admitting the fruits of illegality into evidence."' 72 The Court found the
ability of "those who execute the criminal laws of the country" to utilize
evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections "should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all
times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights." 73
Weeks' constitutional mandate of the exclusionary rule has since
been overruled, 174 but the application of the rule through judicial
discretion has been used as a necessary and ade uate remedy in part
because of its protection of judicial integrity. 1 Indeed, "judicial
167. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-95 (2006) (discussing the court's
inception of the exclusionary rule).
168. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ("The Fourth Amendment
contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a
past unlawful search or seizure 'work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."'(quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974))).
169. Id. at 922-25 (detailing the circumstances in which exclusion would be appropriate
despite an issuance of a constitutionally required warrant).
170. Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A More Majestic Conception ": The
Importance ofJudicialIntegrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47,
48-50 (2010).
171. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
172.

STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 494 (8th ed. 2007).

173. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
174. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
175. See, e.g., Adamson v. C.I.R., 745 F.2d 541, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1984) ("We believe that
implicit in [United States v. Leon] is a recognition that had the police unreasonably violated the
defendant's [F]ourth [A]mendment rights, the integrity of the courts would be implicated.");
State v. Hess 785 N.W.2d 568, 555-84 (Wis. 2010) (stating that the Supreme Court has
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integrity" as the main rationale to the exclusionary rule has recently
started "to recede into footnotes," as the "deterrence" rationale has
become the more favorable justification used by courts to exclude
evidence.176 Still, some legal scholars have argued for the "judicial
integrity" rationale to once again become the primary focus on whether
courts should apply the exclusionary rule.177 Overall, the protection of
judicial integrity has, at least in part, influenced the court's decision to
exclude evidence from judicial proceedings when such action would
call into question the rectitude of the judiciary. 7 8

III. FREEING THE PROP 8 TAPE: A RE-EXAMINATION

OF

PERRY V. BROWN

After a closer look at the circumstances leading up to the Proposition
8 trial recording, and a better understanding of the competing interests
addressed by the Ninth Circuit, this Note argues that Perry v. Brown
should have upheld Judge Ware's decision to unseal the Proposition 8
trial recording. Looking at the issue narrowly, there is an argument that
the Ninth Circuit mischaracterizes, or at least overemphasizes, the
"promises" made by Judge Walker. A breakdown of the "unequivocal
assurances" made by the judge shows a somewhat questionable
interpretation by the Ninth Circuit and, under an abuse of discretion
standard, should have resulted in the court deferring to Judge Ware's
decision to unseal the recording.
Despite the questions surrounding Judge Walker's statements, the
Ninth Circuit is clear that, regardless of "whether [Judge Ware] failed to
recognize that Chief Judge Walker's statements were solemn assurances
to the parties, or whether he believed that he could set those assurances
aside because they were made by another judge,"l 79 the inconsistency in
judicial discretion created by unsealing the record questioned the
credibility of the judiciary and was enough to overcome the
"preserve[d] judicial integrity as a secondary consideration when applying the exclusionary
rule.").
176. Bloom & Fentin, supra note 170, at 53 (explaining that "a balancing test emerged
listing deterrence as the sole benefit and highlighting the substantial social costs of exclusion,
specifically the obstructions to conviction and suppression of reliable evidence being
suppressed, as weighing strongly against application of the disfavored remedy").
177. See id at 47-50 (outlining the argument that "the exclusionary rule [should] be
returned to its previous prominence by reinstating judicial integrity as its primary purpose.").
178. Id. at 80 ("[W]hile the majority of the Supreme Court is willing to let the relevance of
judicial integrity fade into historical obscurity, it appears that this rationale may remain a
powerful force in constitutional law and help retain the exclusionary rule as a necessary adjunct
to the Fourth Amendment right.").
179. Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012).
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presumptive right of access. However, the determination that judicial
integrity is a compelling means of preventing a judge from unsealing
judicial records sets in play a policy that can have significant
consequences for the future of accessing the records of civil
proceedings. While the Ninth Circuit assures in its opinion the
protection of judicial integrity in this case was one of narrow scope,' 8 0
the ramifications could stifle the recent trend toward a more open
judiciary, and could result in a persuasive stance for other courts
looking to prevent the transparency of controversial proceedings like the
Proposition 8 trials. By focusing on the interplay between two district
judges as to whether the recording could be released, the Ninth Circuit
systematically avoided answering some of the more fundamental
questions related to the First Amendment and the question of whether
the public has a right to view the recording of one of the most
influential nonjury civil trials in recent memory.
A. A Narrow Approach: The Statements ofJudge Walker and the
Scope of a Promise
In order to place such significance on the integrity of the judicial
process, the Ninth Circuit made two important conclusions: (1) Judge
Ware had, "without 'support in inferences that may be drawn from the
facts in the record,"' determined that the original promises made by
Judge Walker had no relation to whether the recording could be
disclosed to the public one year later;'' and (2) by failing to make the
logical determination that Judge Walker had promised the sealing of the
record indefinitely, Judge Ware had stifled the integrity of the judicial
process to a point in which the court abused its discretion when
deciding to release the recording.' 82 Before the issue of preserving
judicial integrity as a means of overcoming the presumed right of access
is discussed, a closer look at the assumed "unsupported inferences"' 83
discussed by the Ninth Circuit is warranted.
In finding that Judge Ware misinterpreted Judge Walker's
statements, the Ninth Circuit focused on two of Judge Walker's
statements that were believed to have formed "unequivocal assurance"
that the Proposition 8 trial recording was not to be released to the
public: (1) the statements by Judge Walker that he was "going to
continue 'taking the recording for purposes of use in chambers,' but that
180. Id. at 1081 ("We resolve the narrow question before us on a narrow basis when we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the
recording.").
181. Id. at 1085.
182. Id. at 1087-88.
183. Id.at 1085.
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the recording was 'not going to be for the purposes of public
broadcasting or televising;'" 8 4 and (2) the statements by Judge Walker
that he believed "the potential for public broadcast . . . had been

eliminated."' 8 5 However, relying on these statements to hold that an
"unequivocal assurance" had been made to the parties poses a concern
for two reasons. First, there is a significant difference between a
promise not to live "broadcast" a trial, and a promise to prevent the
dissemination of the "recording" of the trial years down the road.
Second, even without a clear distinction between the usage of the terms
"broadcasting" and "recording," enough ambiguity arises which should
have, at the very least, required the Ninth Circuit to defer to Judge
Ware. Such ambiguity diminishes any argument that an "unequivocal
assurance" was made that could be reasonably, objectively relied upon
by the proponents. With a closer look at the facts in this case, the
argument that judicial integrity is a credible and "compelling interest"
to overcome the First Amendment or the common law presumption of
access is questionable.
The context in which Judge Walker made his statements against the
broadcasting of the Proposition 8 trial could be reasonably limited to the
live broadcasting of the trial. Judge Walker's first statement-that the
recordings were not for public broadcasting or televising-were made
in the backdrop of the Supreme Court's permanent stay.' 86 With the
Supreme Court's focus on whether to affirm the district court's decision
to permit the live broadcast of the trial,' 8 7 it would be logical to
conclude Judge Walker's promises were limited to just that-the live
broadcasting of the trial. For all practical purposes, the Ninth Circuit
was correct. Judge Walker assured the parties the possibility for public
broadcast had been eliminated and the recording was not going to be
used for the purposes of public broadcasting and televising. Indeed,
these promises were kept. Judge Walker himself was a bit hesitant to
return his copy of the trial recording,' 8 8 providing some indication that
he never intended his statement to extend to protecting the recording
years later.
Additionally, much can be said about the plain meaning of
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. In fact, the court in Perryrecognized that Judge Walker's statements were "following
the Supreme Court's issuance of a stay against the public broadcast of the trial." Id. at 1085.
187. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 184-89 (2010) (per curiam) (explaining
the circumstances leading up to the decision to stay the live broadcast of the Proposition 8 trial).
188. See Letter from Chief Judge Vaughn Walker, supra note 1 (noting that Judge Walker
would abide by the court's directive, but noted that the video "was made available to the parties
in that case" and that the "[t]he Perry case involved a public trial"). It is also important to note
that Judge Walker concluded his letter with the words of Chief Justice Berger in Richmond
Newspapers, which appears at the beginning of this paper. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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"broadcasting" or "televising," which was the focus of Judge Walker's
statements, and the Proposition 8 trial "recording," which was at issue
in this case. A clear distinction between the two terms is made in the
rule that formed the catalyst to this litigation, Civil Local Rule 77-3,
which states that "[u]nless allowed by a Judge or a Magistrate Judge
with respect to his or her own chambers . . . the taking of photographs,
public broadcastingor televising, or recording . .. is prohibited."' 9 A

common principle of statutory interpretation is that every clause and
word of a statute has a specific meaning, and courts should "avoid
rendering superfluous" a rule's language. o While this is not a pure
question of statutory interpretation, using the text of Civil Local Rule
77-3 as guidance lends some support that Judge Walker's promise to
continue "recording" the trial, but not to continue "broadcasting or
televising" the trial, was not broken by Judge Ware when he unsealed
the record.
The backdrop of the district court's Local Civil Rule 79-5(f) also
lends some peculiarity to the Ninth Circuit's decision. Rule 79-5(f)
states that "[a]ny document filed under seal in a civil case shall be open
to public inspection without further action by the Court [ten] years from
the date the case is closed."'91 Parties are only allowed to circumvent
the ten-year rule if "upon showing good cause at the conclusion of the
case," they "seek an order that would continue the seal until a specific
date beyond the [ten] years."l92 It is important to note this rule was in
effect at the time that Judge Walker made his assurances that the trial
recording would be sealed from public broadcasting.' 93 With such a
local rule in place, no judge could ever faithfully promise that a sealed
trial record would never be released to the public without further
action.194 It would also seem logical that Judge Walker's statements
would be made with this rule in mind and at least give some support to
the argument that his decision to seal the recording was not one that
contemplated future attempts to access the recordings.
Even taking these arguments with reservations-as they are by no
189. Civ. C. R. 77-3 (amended in 2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.cand.
uscourts.gov/localrules/civil#DISTRICT.
190.

YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS

12 (2008) (quoting Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112
(1991)).
191. CIv. C. R. 79-5(f), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/civil#DI
STRICT.
192. Id.
193. Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1085 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012).
194. The Ninth Circuit passively acknowledges that the proponents could have reasonably
made this conclusion as well, stating that "[the p]roponents reasonably relied on Chief Judge

Walker's specific assurances . . . that the recording would not be broadcast to the public, at least
in theforeseeablefuture." Id. at 1084-85 (emphasis added).
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means irrefutable' 95-the Ninth Circuit was faced with whether the
lower court abused its discretion in concluding Judge Walker did not
promise that the recording would remain sealed. 6 Generally, the
decision of whether the common law presumption of access to the
judicial record has been overcome by a party is "one best left to the
sound discretion of the trial court."'" In order for Judge Ware's
decision to have been an abuse of discretion, the decision must have
been "without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in
the record." 98 It seems that an argument could be made either way as to
the interpretation of Judge Walker's promises, but one should be
skeptical of the Ninth Circuit determining that Judge Ware's decision
was "implausible" or "without support."99 To claim that "[n]o other
inference" can be plausibly drawn from the record misrepresents the
context in which the statements were made and the distinction between
the live broadcasting of a trial and releasing a previous recording. 200
B. A BroadApproach: The Right ofAccess vs. JudicialIntegrity
Upon its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit was ultimately faced with a
choice between two competing values that can be summed up into one
question: is protecting judicial integrity by avoiding inconsistent orders
by district judges compelling enough to shut out the public from the
presumptive access to a judicial record? With the court answering this
question in the affirmative, it is society that is left with the
consequences of the decision. Even though the trial's written transcript
is available, 2 0 1 the public is still deprived of the more telling visual
195. The Ethics and Public Policy Center, for instance, would no doubt disagree with the
propositions this Note suggests. In their Amicus Curie brief to the Supreme Court on the
substantive issues related to Proposition 8, the Centbr cites to Judge Walker's "egregious course
of misconduct," including his "defiance" of the Court's January order, as a demonstration of
why the Court "should be especially wary of accepting at face value any assertion made by
[Judge Walker]." Amicus Curie Brief of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Support of
Petitioners and Supporting Reversal or Vacatur, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (Jan. 29,
2013) 2013 WL 416202, at *1-8.
196. Perry, 667 F.3d at 1081.
197. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-02292JW, 2011 WL 4527349, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Nixon v.
Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) ("Every court has supervisory power over its
own records and files.").
198. Perry, 667 F.3d at 1084 (citing United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.
2008) (internal quotations omitted).
199. Scwarzenegger, 2011 WL 4527349, at *4 (holding that "the record [did] not support
the contention that Judge Walker limited the digital recording").
200. Perry, 667 F.3d at 1085.
201.

See Transcripts, AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR EQUAL RIGHTs, http://www.afer.org/

our-work/hearing-transcripts/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
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depiction of the proceedings. 20 2 The ability for academics, professors,
and judges to learn from the "more interesting, informative, compelling,
and . . . realistic" portrayal of a nationally controversial civil trial is

eliminated.20 3 Sealing the tape also diminishes an individual's ability to
use the recording of this heated controversy as a form of artistic outlet
through reenactments and theatrical interpretations, 2 04 all in the name of
"preserving judicial integrity." Such an impact could be significant.
The First Amendment right and the common law presumption of an
open judiciary is in itself a protection of judiciary integrity that went
unrecognized by the Ninth Circuit. Judicial integrity, as discussed
above, 5 is a conceptual value that takes many forms in order to protect
the judiciary. The reliance on judicial integrity has been used to protect
the consistency of the court system and also to protect the
administration of justice, as demonstrated by its use as a founding
principle of the exclusionary rule. Important to this case, and
overlooked by the Ninth Circuit, is the importance of preserving
transparency in the judiciary as a protection of judicial integrity. 206 The
importance of transparency was made clear by Justice Brennan in
RichmondNewspapers, Inc.:
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of
the trial process. Open trials assure the public that procedural
rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally. Closed
trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn
spawns disrespect for law. Public access is essential, therefore, if
trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintainingpublic
confidence in the administrationofjustice.20T

202. Plaintiffs' lawyer Theodore Boutrous, for instance, claimed that the proponents
"[knew] the videotape would expose their baseless campaign of fear and [would have] let the
public see the powerful evidence [the plaintiffs'] submitted." Bob Egelko, Court OrdersProp. 8
Trial Video to Remain Sealed, S.F. GATE (Feb. 3, 2012, 4:00 A.M.), http://www.sfgate.com/
news/article/Court-orders-Prop-8-trial-videos-to-remain-sealed-2959499.php.
203. Judge Walker himself stated that the he had used segments of the tape after his
retirement during lectures on "cameras in the courtroom." Letter from Chief Judge Vaughn
Walker, supra note 1.
204. Use of the trial transcript has been used to reenact the trial by celebrities and
supporters, and a play, 8, has been in production in order "to spread the word about this historic
trial." Adam Bink & Jacob Combs, Why the 9th Circuit Decision on the Prop. 8 Tape
Undermines Our Democracy, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (FEB. 3, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/adam-bink/prop-8-tapes-b_1252816.html.
205. See supra Part II.B.
206. See Bunker, supra note 107, at 157-58 (citing that one of the Justices in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. "noted that access to trails encouraged public perception that trials were fair").
207. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428-29 (1979)
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By pointing only to "credibility" as the defining characteristic of
judicial integrity relevant to whether the Proposition 8 trial recording
should be released, the Ninth Circuit insufficiently framed the value of
judicial integrity in the context of this case.2 0 8
By placing such a high emphasis on protecting the promises of
district judges, the continued growth of a common law or constitutional
right of access to civil proceedings might be stunted. The right of access
is an innovation of the First Amendment that is still in its infancy. 209
With a strong history in favor of an open judiciary, along with a
majority of circuits recognizing its First Amendment value, the
constitutional right of access to civil proceedings should not be too far
off from recognition by the Supreme Court.21 But to find that vague
assurances by a lower court judge are compelling reasons to overcome
this First Amendment protection, as the Ninth Circuit did in Perry,2 1 1
sets the stage for a weak, or severely limited, constitutional right. While
the Ninth Circuit is, obviously, not binding outside of its own
jurisdiction, the tendency of circuit courts to rely on one another for the
sake of consistency could result in the spread of judicial integrity as a
means to deny disclosure. 2 12
Above all else, by relying on the preservation of judicial integrity as
the "compelling" reason to prevent access to the Proposition 8 trial
recording, the Ninth Circuit ignored some pivotal legal issues
surrounding whether, and to what extent, the public has a right of access
to civil proceedings. The Ninth Circuit was quick to "simply assume,
without deciding" that a common law presumption and a First
Amendment right of access to civil proceedings existed.2 1 3 Questions
such as whether the common law presumption of access apply or
whether a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings exist are
extremely influential 2 14 and can provide answers that support and
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting)) (emphasis added).
208. See Bink & Combs, supra note 204 ("In choosing to keep the recordings under seal,
the 9th Circuit has unfortunately dealt a blow to transparency in the courtroom.").
209. Supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
210. See Bunker, supra note 107, at 167 (stating that, while some lower courts have
"mixed reactions to First Amendment access claims in civil proceedings . . . most have
recognized some form of presumptive access right").
211. Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012).
212. See Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55,
76-79 (2009) (arguing that circuit courts rely heavily on other Circuits as persuasive authority).
213. Perry, 667 F.3d at 1084, 1088.
214. When addressing the constitutional right of access to criminal trials, the Supreme
Court was apt to opine that the right of access "plays a particularly significant role in the
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole" and "enhances the quality
and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to
society as a whole." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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expand the ideals of an open government. 215 Another issue, the chilling
effect to expert witness testimony, also went untouched by the Ninth
Circuit. By escaping these more complex issues, the court neglected the
importance that having a resolution to these questions might have
216
provided for many journalists, bloggers, and even curious citizens.
By quickly shutting the door to these more controversial discussions,
the Ninth Circuit ignored issues that could have had a tremendous effect
on how society interacts with its government, and more specifically, its
judiciary.
C. Where We Go From Here: ObservationsFrom Perry v. Brown
A few brief observations are warranted given the Ninth Circuit's
decision to deny disclosing the Proposition 8 trial recording. First, it is
clear only a few subtle phrases were needed by Judge Walker in order to
satisfy the Ninth Circuit's belief that a promise was made to seal the
trial recording indefinitely. The result is that judges could be potentially
shackled to their previous discretionary determinations, even when
faced with a possible constitutional infringement, so as not to disrupt
"judicial integrity." Again, the extent of the Ninth Circuit's decision
was expressed in narrow terms, but how this ruling will really affect
future Ninth Circuit cases, or sister circuits for that matter, is yet to be
seen and should be cause for concern. Regardless of where the burden
falls, more communication on behalf of all parties and judges during the
Proposition 8 trials would have at least more properly set the case up for
a determination on one of the proponents' more arguable First
Amendment challenges. 2 17
Second, the value of judicial integrity is so multifaceted that while it
is important to uphold, it should be used sparingly as a means of
determining whether judicial records should be disclosed. While the
Ninth Circuit relied on consistency and predictability to justify its
decision, the court could just as easily have relied on transparency to
215. See supra Part II.A.1.
216. See Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The ConstitutionalRight to Information, 42 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 357, 361 (2011) ("The ability of individuals, interest groups, and
organizations to actively participate in political debates deciding issues on the public agenda, as
well as the very possibility of placing issues on that agenda, is tightly linked to their ability to
obtain relevant information."). The right of access to the judiciary can "represent[] . . . an initial
condition for the public's participation in the democratic game," protect citizens through the
oversight of government processes, and allow for the exercise of other constitutional rights. Id.
at 360-70.
217. Instead of focusing on judicial integrity, the Ninth Circuit could have, for example,
focused on the proponents' "chilling" expert witness's argument that the district court found
mere "unsupported hypothesis or conjecture." Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-02292JW,
2011 WL 4527349, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011).
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reach the opposite conclusion-all of which are recognized traits of
judicial integrity. 218 Judicial integrity, thus, should not be a tool that
encourages selectivity among its many traits. Courts should either
formulate all of the traits that encompass the interest of "judicial
integrity" and weight the interest accordingly, or avoid using the interest
of "judicial integrity" in the context of judicial access. To continue to
use individualized aspects of judicial integrity of the court's choosing
could, ironically, allow for unpredictable, ambiguous, and inconsistent
discretionary rulings by judges.
Finally, now may be the time for the Supreme Court to finally
answer whether the First Amendment affords individuals the right of
access to civil proceedings as it does for criminal proceedings. Both the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit were quick to avoid the issue of a
First Amendment right altogether. However, with a definitive answer as
to the right of access to civil proceedings, the circumstances of this case
might have been drastically different. At the writing of this Note, the
Supreme Court had vacated the Ninth Circuit's substantive ruling in
Perry v. Brown and remanded the case due to issues related to
standing.219 While the door seems to be closed for the Perry decision to
bring the right of access issue to the Supreme Court, the move by the
Judicial Conference of the United States to experiment with video
recording nonjury civil trials may make the issue more suitable for
resolution.
CONCLUSION

The controversy surrounding Proposition 8 and the legal proceedings
that followed will no doubt continue to capture the nation's attention.
However, because of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, those of us not present
at the Proposition 8 district court hearings will have to continue to wait
to see what occurred during the trial. While both the presumption of
access to judicial proceedings and the integrity of the judiciary are
fundamental aspects of our country's court system, the importance of
our society to have a right of access to the Proposition 8 trial recording
cannot be stressed enough. Looking at the facts leading up to the
decision, a sound argument could be made that Judge Walker's
218. Compare supra Part II.B.2 (consistency and predictability), with Part III.B
(transparency). The Model Code of Judicial Conduct includes a few more nouns in its definition,
defining "integrity" as "probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character."
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007).
219. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-144 8okO.pdf (holding that the Proponent-Petitioners did
not have standing, and therefore the Court had no authority to decide the case on the merits).
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"unequivocal assurances" are not unequivocal at all. In a broader sense,
the protections of society's right of access to civil proceedings, based on
either common law tradition or through a First Amendment right, could
in and of itself protect the integrity of the judiciary that the Ninth
Circuit seems so fearful in diminishing. Despite the arguments, the
criticisms, and the observations, it seems that society can do nothing
more but wait in order to one day free the Prop 8 tape.
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EDITOR'S NOTE

Since its inception in 1987, the University of FloridaJournal of Law
and Public Policy has fostered contemporary discourse on judicial
decisions, legislation, law reform, and other legal and social issues
facing public policy decisionmakers. As the only interdisciplinary
publication at the Levin College of Law, JLPP publishes three issues
per year, containing analytical and thought-provoking articles written by
lawyers, judges, scholars, and public officers.
In this issue, you will find writings on life imprisonment sentences for
juveniles, contract theory, human trafficking, transfer development
rights and religious views in support of law and public policy. One of
the articles highlights the increased need for state action to protect
trafficked children and punish the offenders. Another article focuses on
religious advocacy in the political realm and how Christian values have
been misconstrued. In addition to analyzing strengths and weaknesses
of Miami's transferable development rights program, this issue includes
a note analyzing contract theory and the illusion of public employees'
constitutional right to collectively bargain in Florida.
The issue concludes with a case comment, awarded the Huber C. Hurst
award, analyzing the United States Supreme Court's missed opportunity
for a categorical rule against life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for juveniles. The case comment analyzes the Supreme
Court's 2012 case Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life
sentences, not discretionary life sentences, for juveniles are
impermissible under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments.
Four years ago JLPP set an extraordinary precedent as the first journal
at the University of Florida, and one of the first nationwide, to go green.
By replacing cluttered shelves, heavy binders and overworked printers
with an electronic system that allows journal members to edit articles
electronically and from remote locations, JLPP is setting the precedent
for all other UF law journals and reviews.
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The University of FloridaJournalof Law and Public Policy would like
to sincerely thank the staff, faculty and student members who worked so
diligently in bringing this issue together. The Journal appreciates all
subscribers and readers.
Stephanie Moncada
Editor-in-Chief
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The University ofFloridaJournalofLaw andPublic Policy is an
interdisciplinary organization whose primary purpose is the publication
of scholarly articles on contemporary legal and social issues facing
public policy decisionmakers. The Journal is composed of two
governing bodies: the Advisory Board and the Executive Board. The
Advisory Board is comprised of faculty and honorary members who
provide independent guidance. The Executive Board, which includes
both law and graduate students, is responsible for researching and
preparing each volume for publication. The Executive Board also selects
the articles that are published. All student members must complete a
writing requirement and help research and prepare the Journal for
publication.

The Journal thanks Marjorie A. Niblack and the Office of
Instructional Resources, University of Florida, for the use of the Century
Tower graphic on the back cover.

V

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This issue of the University of Florida Journal of Law and
Public Policy is a direct result of the collaboration and hard work of the
Journalmembers, staff, advisors, sponsors, and contributing authors.
The Journal extends its deep appreciation for the generosity of
the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law and the Huber
C. Hurst Fund in supporting and assisting the Journalin its publication
of this issue and for supporting our multidisciplinary journal concept.
Special thanks to our faculty advisor, Teresa J. Reid, and our
staff editor, Victoria A. Redd.

Please visit us on the web at www.law.ufl.edu under News
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